

~~SECRET~~

Att. #1

Recommendation No. 4

That, within each sensitive agency where the practice is not now being followed: (a) strict personnel security standards, including standards of personal conduct, be applied to all personnel having access to sensitive information or sensitive operations; (b) that these standards be applied equally to civilian and military personnel regardless of rank; and (c) that serious questions of doubt concerning personnel having such access be resolved in favor of the national security.

Comment

Concur. It should be the goal of the intelligence community to establish standardized and strict personnel security criteria for all personnel, military and civilian, participating in intelligence activities. All personnel having access to sensitive information or sensitive operations should meet like security criteria prior to access and their continued security well-being should be monitored thereafter on a generally uniform basis.

A standardized security program for all intelligence personnel could best be achieved by each agency developing centralized security control from an organizational standpoint together with uniform criteria and standardized techniques for the application of the criteria. Such standardized security programs would greatly facilitate the exchange of personnel between departments and agencies and would enhance greater participation in joint projects without security variations.

A standardized security program for intelligence personnel would lead to a more uniform approach to the resolution of questions involving an individual's suitability and would certainly foster the protection of national security interests.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Security Committee of the USIB could assist in the development of uniform personnel security standards and the preparation of guidelines for the monitoring of personal conduct.

Recommendation No. 6

That, as a means of achieving major counterintelligence objectives, actions be taken within the sensitive agencies, as required, to assure the conduct of periodic, comprehensive, inspections concerning the adequacy of compliance with approved policies relating to personnel security investigations and clearances, security suspension of employees, physical security, document control, and the like.

Comment

Concur. An inherent part of an effective security program is a system of periodic inspections to ensure the adequacy of all aspects of security. Such inspections are best conducted by an independent authority such as the inspector-general facility. In addition, security officers themselves should continuously study and seek improvement in the programs they implement and administer.

Since the USIB Policy Statement on Counterintelligence and Security Responsibilities (USIB-D-1.5/24 Approved 18 July 1962) calls for semi-annual reports on security and counterintelligence developments in the agencies, inspection-inspired changes could be included in these same reports. The Guide on Security and Counterintelligence Practices and Procedures to the Policy Statement sets forth the essentials of a basic security program, and utilization of this Guide as an aid to security surveys would be beneficial.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Security Committee, USIB, will, if called upon, assist in the development of additional formats.

Recommendation No. 8

That arrangements be made within each sensitive agency, as required, to assure that security counterintelligence-oriented personnel participate in the timely review at the Headquarters level of all questionable personnel security cases which develop within that agency.

Comment

Concur. Each agency or department should have a system providing for security-counterintelligence reviews of questionable personnel security cases. Such security cases should be reviewed and closely monitored by security personnel with the highest degree of understanding and sophistication in opposition penetration techniques. All investigative assets and capabilities should be utilized to the fullest extent in such cases.

Recommendations No. 9

That, in the continuing effort to instill an enhanced sense of security responsibility on the part of all personnel in the sensitive agencies, the case be used in the security indoctrination processes of those agencies as a striking example of a most serious espionage penetration and of the failure to inculcate the degree of security consciousness which should obtain among the personnel of all sensitive agencies.

25X1

Comment

25X1